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Abstract
This paper examines how import penetration affects firms’ productivity growth taking into
account the heterogeneity in firms’ distance to the efficiency frontier and country differences in
product market regulation. Using firm-level data for a substantial number of OECD countries
from the late 1990s to late 2000s, the analysis reveals non-linear effects of both sectoral import
penetration and de jure product market regulation measures depending on firms’ positions along
the global distribution of productivity levels. A magnifying effect is found between import
penetration and domestic barriers to entry, conditional on a firm’s distance to the technological
frontier. The heterogeneous effects of international competition and domestic product market
regulation on firm-level productivity growth are consistent with a neo-Schumpeterian view of
trade and regulation. Close to the technology frontier, import competition has a strongly positive
effect on firm-level productivity growth, with stringent domestic regulation reducing this effect
substantially. However, far from the frontier, neither import competition nor its interaction
with domestic regulation has a statistically significant effect on firm-level productivity growth.
The results also suggest that insufficient attention has been made in the trade literature to
within-firm productivity growth.
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1 Introduction
Globalization has dramatically reduced “explicit” barriers to international trade in OECD as well
as non-OECD countries over recent decades. These tariff-type barriers have fallen far enough
in manufacturing that they likely no longer represent a major obstacle to goods exporting and
importing (Boue¨t et al., 2008). Institutional limits on protection that prevent countries from
raising tariffs even in times of economic crisis have so far proven effective in preventing a bout
of defensive, or retaliatory, anti-trade measures, even in the context of the panic-inducing Great
Recession that we have just experienced. Nevertheless, behind-the-border regulation still remains
quite stringent in many economies (OECD, 2011), representing an important opportunity for further
trade liberalization.
Stringent regulation of domestic product markets obstructs firm entry, operation and exit,
thereby limiting competition, which can reduce firms’ ability and incentives to improve their pro-
ductivity. However, the mechanisms that cause weak competition to hamper productivity are not
fully understood. In their recent review of endogenous growth theory, Aghion and Howitt (2009)
argue that there is a U-shaped relationship between the degree of competition and productivity,
where firms closer to the global technological frontier face stronger incentives to innovate in order
to overcome the potential threat of new entrants. Near the frontier, stringent regulation reduces
neck-to-neck competition and innovation, harming firm productivity. In contrast, farther from
the frontier, Schumpeter (Mark II)-type effects dominate and firms face discouragement, making
innovation and productivity growth less likely, regardless of regulation.
While new trade theory also considers heterogeneity in firm technological efficiency, it takes
a different perspective, with most theoretical papers viewing firms’ productivity levels as given
and then investigating how productivity changes in the aftermath of trade liberalization. Vari-
ous models featuring heterogeneous firms, notably Melitz’s (2003), posit that trade liberalization
yields entry and exit dynamics that reallocate market shares from low-productivity firms to higher
productivity firms that compete in international markets. Bernard et al. (2007) show how this
process can help strengthen comparative advantage through creative destruction, though in neither
case do the dynamics come about through intra-firm productivity dynamics. Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008) highlight the pro-competitive effect of trade taking into account market size. They show
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that sectoral productivity can be enhanced through increasing toughness of import competition,
implying the potential for dynamic gains from policy reform.
This paper builds on the intuition of new trade models on the pro-competitive effect of trade
along with the prediction of endogenous growth models where the effect of competition and reg-
ulation on firm productivity depends on firms’ efficiency levels. It takes a difference-in-differences
approach that uses the insights from the new trade literature to identify the empirical effects of
import competition and anti-competitive domestic regulation on productivity at the firm level, also
incorporating distance-to-technological frontier effects. In so doing, it develops new evidence in
support of both sets of theories, suggesting that (i) trade models could be enriched by incorporat-
ing a distance-to-frontier and intra-firm productivity dimension, and (ii) distance-to-frontier ideas
could be further enriched by examining their interactions with trade, helping to better explain the
underlying mechanisms.
Beyond these general insights, several important findings stand out:
• Stronger competition, in the form of higher import penetration, is associated with higher
firm-level productivity growth close to the technological (measured in terms of productivity
levels) frontier, an effect that remains robust even when estimated in lags, though it varies
when the smallest firms are over-sampled in the dataset. The main result is consistent with
the predictions of the Aghion endogenous growth model as well as the Melitz and Ottaviano
framework, though the latter would not have predicted a differential firm-level effect vis-a`-vis
the technology frontier.
• Close to the technology frontier, anti-competitive product market regulation substantially
reduces the scope for TFP improvements spurred by import competition; far from the frontier,
the interaction between regulation and foreign competition is not statistically significant. The
effect of product market regulation depends on the sectoral trade orientation; more precisely,
stringent product market regulation is found to damage the scope for productivity growth
at least in part by reducing the competition-enhancing effect of import competition on top
firms.
• The productivity-enhancing effect of import competition and the mitigating effect of product
market regulation are robust to the inclusion of a Herfindahl index that captures the market
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shares concentration across firms, controls for the stringency of upstream regulation, as well as
country-time fixed effects and industry fixed effects that capture respectively country specific
policies or macroeconomic shocks and time-invariant industry-specific characteristics such as
the intensity of ICT use.
In order to examine these questions, a large-scale firm database (Amadeus) is examined that
covers close to half of the OECD member countries, which is then re-weighted to be representative
of the actual size distribution of firms in the whole population, and matched with regulation and
trade datasets. This firm data is sufficient to allow for the measurement of robust productivity
measures that take account of potential simultaneity biases. Unique OECD indexes of product
market regulation are used to measure de jure regulatory settings, at the country level and across
time. International trade data are matched with production data, to generate measures of import
penetration at the detailed industry level.
While there is previous evidence on the effect of domestic regulation on productivity, these
studies have in general not examined their interaction with trade. A number of empirical studies,
particularly those of the OECD (2003, 2006, 2011), have found distortionary effects of indicators of
product and labor market regulation on overall productivity outcomes. For instance, Arnold et al.
(2010) look at the effect of product market regulation on firm-level productivity – through the ICT
channel – and find supportive evidence of distance-to-frontier effects. At the industry level, Bourle`s
et al. look at the effect of upstream product market regulation on sector-level productivity, and
they also find distance-to-frontier effects. Conway et al. found similar sectoral effects for broader
market regulation, while Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) found related, yet inverted, effects with
respect to the distance-to-frontier.
More aggregate empirical work has used less detailed indicators of institutional and policy
settings to examine the role of institutions in mediating the role of trade in affecting overall growth
and productivity outcomes. Cross-country studies include Dollar and Kraay (2003), Rodrick et al.
(2004), Alcala´ and Ciccone (2004), and Freund and Bolaky (2008), who have tried to disentangle
the respective roles of institutions and trade for growth at the country level. On balance, the
evidence appears to suggest that institutions have a more fundamental role, as they complement
trade liberalization, and strengthen the long-term effects of trade on growth, by enhancing the role
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of comparative advantage. However, the types of policies and reforms that may drive productivity
in this context are still not clear from this literature.1
Research at the level of the firm seems more promising to reveal the underlying mechanics
of how policies may work through trade to affect productivity and growth outcomes. Firm-level
analysis has revealed a substantial role for product market regulation in affecting the margins of
firm exit and entry as well as reallocation of productivity across firms (e.g., Bartelsman et al.
(2009)). However, this work does not explicitly consider how international trade may drive and/or
reinforce these margins.
There have been a series of country-specific firm-level studies that have identified substantial
roles for international trade (not behind-the-border) regulation specifically in affecting firm en-
try/exit and reallocative margins, for Chile (Pavcnik, 2002; Bas and Ledezma, 2010), Columbia
(Fernandez, 2007), France (Bas and Strauss-Kahn, 2011), India (Topalova, 2004; Goldberg et al.,
2010), Indonesia (Amiti and Konings, 2007) and the UK (Aghion et al., 2009). Several of these
studies show that reductions in import barriers can help to boost within-firm productivity (Amiti
and Konings, 2007; Bas and Ledezma, 2010; Goldberg et al., 2010).
However, these single-country studies do not address behind-the-border regulation, which varies
principally across countries.2 We thus contribute to the literature – addressing the questions
raised above – by estimating productivity growth equations, at the firm level, where exposure to
international markets and to domestic regulation both interact. The paper finds that their effect can
be non-linear and depends on the characteristics of heterogeneous firms – especially their distance
to the global technological frontier. Moreover, the scope for this type of behind-the-border reform
appears to be vast.
The paper proceeds as follows. The second section describes the data and sampling frame,
the construction of productivity, import penetration and domestic regulation measures. The third
section motivates the empirical approach, and examines the effects of import penetration and
domestic regulation on firm-level productivity growth. The fourth section concludes.
1One promising approach from a related literature uses incomplete contract theory to examine the effect of overall
institutional quality on the organization of trade. Studies following this approach include Acemoglu et al. (2007),
who find an important role of contracting institutions leading to strengthened comparative advantage.
2Although not focused on productivity, Crozet et al. (2012) take an innovative approach to addressing the effect of
different countries’ domestic regulations on services trade, using bilateral export data from French firms. The study
finds strong detrimental effects of purely domestic regulations on both the extensive and intensive export margins of
the firms – with domestic regulations being even more damaging for trade than explicit international trade barriers.
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2 Data and measurement
In order to investigate the questions raised above, firm-level data are used to compute productivity
measures, sectoral trade data are used to measure foreign competition, and restrictive regulation
is measured using the OECD’s economy-wide indexes of product market regulation.
2.1 Firm-level data: Amadeus
Firm level data are used based on company reports included in the Amadeus database compiled
by the Bureau van Dijk. This database covers European OECD countries over the time period
1995–2005. The countries with sufficient numbers of firms for our use are Belgium, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The data for Greece are not used since they lack wage
and materials data. While all the countries included are OECD members, the former transition
economies of Central and Eastern Europe are likely to have a wider dispersion of productivity
across firms than the other countries as a result of their one-time structural transitions.
Data are cleaned for potential outliers that we identify by several criteria. First, firms with
negative values for any variable entering the production function – operating revenue or value
added, wages, capital stock, material inputs – or with depreciation higher than net capital stock
are eliminated from the sample. Firms that report extreme year-to-year variation in ratios between
production function variables and extreme reversals in one of these variables are not retained,
either. Finally, outliers have been removed by eliminating the top and bottom one percent of
the productivity distribution and subsequently re-estimating productivity without these extreme
observations. The productivity estimation is described in more detail below.
Sectoral coverage includes all tradable goods and services, including mining, all of manufacturing
(ISIC 15 to 37), electricity, utilities (ISIC 40, 51, 52), transport and communications (ISIC 60 to
64), business activities as R&D, advertising (ISIC 71 to 74) and recreational and cultural activities
(ISIC 92). Consolidated accounts in the Amadeus dataset are dropped, which avoids problems of
double-counting.
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2.2 Sampling frame
The Amadeus data are broadly representative of the business sectors of OECD countries, since they
include virtually all public companies, and as such are a fair representation of larger companies.
However, smaller firms are underrepresented, since they typically do not report balance sheet
information publicly. In addition, not all firms in the Amadeus data report information on all
production function variables. The remaining sample used in this study includes only firms for
which TFP estimates could be obtained.
In order to ensure that the sample of firms is as representative as possible of the population
distribution of firms across size classes, sectors and countries, a re-sampling procedure was applied
(see Schwellnus and Arnold, 2008). First, population weights for every size-sector-country strata
were calculated from the OECD Structural Demographic Business Statistics (SDBS) database for
the year 2000. Second, random draws with replacement from each size-sector-country strata in the
TFP sample were taken until the weight of each strata corresponds to its population weight.3
This method resulted in a sample that is representative of the population distribution along the
dimensions of employment size, sector and country. The sample size is then set to 139,065 firms
(drawn from a set of 79,513 real firms) which results in 831,187 firm-year observations. While this
method yields a more representative sample in the year 2000, it may also increase measurement
error since ‘successful’ smaller firms are over-sampled. As a result, the resampled dataset may be
less representative as the time period shifts away from the year 2000 since normally such firms have
high rates of entry and exit. Thus, both the non-resampled and the resampled data are considered
in the basic specifications in order to ensure robustness.
2.3 Estimation of Total Factor Productivity
Our productivity variable, total factor productivity (TFP), measures the firm-level efficiency in
the use of all inputs. We calculate TFP as the residual from the estimation of a logarithmic
3The re-sampling procedure is restricted to firms with at least 20 employees since the coverage below this threshold
is unsatisfactory. The firm size classes used for resampling (from SDBS) are: 20-49; 50-99; 100-499; 500 or more
employees.
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Cobb-Douglas production function of the form:
ln yisct = αsc ln lisct + βsc ln kisct + isct (1)
where the subscripts stand for the firm i from country c operating in sector s at time t. The
dependent variable of the production function is the firm’s value-added (y). The production factors
are labor (l) and capital (k). When value-added was not available, it was imputed as the residual
between operating revenue and material inputs. Labor inputs are measured using the total wage
bill, while net capital stocks were used to measure capital input. Nominal values are deflated using
sector-specific price indexes, with the exception of capital stocks that have been deflated using
deflators for gross fixed capital formation. The production function is estimated at the sector-
country level sc, in order to avoid strong assumptions on the homogeneity of production technologies
across sectors and OECD countries. The residuals isct represent plant-specific efficiency in the
year t.
The ideal measure of TFP would be in volume terms, “physical TFP”. However, given the avail-
able data, we use a “revenue-based TFP”. The pluses and minuses of using various measures are
discussed in Foster et al. (2008). In most business micro data sets like Amadeus, establishment-level
prices are unobserved. Thus, establishment output is measured as revenue divided by a common
industry-level deflator. This method embodies within-industry price differences in output and pro-
ductivity measures. Difficulties arise when prices reflect idiosyncratic demand shifts, demographic
characteristics or market power variation rather than differences in quality or production efficiency.4
For instance, a firm sheltered from competition because of some regulatory barriers may set high
prices and according to a “revenue-based TFP” it may look more efficient than a firm in a more
deregulated environment even if their efficiency levels are similar. Since we cannot implement the
Foster et al. treatment, firm fixed effects are considered as controls for time-invariant characteristics
that may determine firm-level prices.5
4Note that an important advantage of using a revenue-based TFP measures is that if we observe positive effects of
competition-related measures on TFP growth, the result is not subject to concerns about markups being conflated,
since markups would reduce TFP growth, thus implicitly the efficiency effects must be dominating.
5Estimates of the main analytical results using firm-level fixed effects are shown in the Annex, Table A.1. These
estimates use the balanced panel dataset, where there are sufficient repeated observations to carry them out, and
show that the baseline results are robust to firm fixed effects. This estimate also addresses concerns about the use of
a Cobb-Douglas production function, if the underlying production function departs from constant returns to scale. In
addition, (insignificant) firm size dummies were used in alternative specifications, and these did not affect the results.
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We now turn to the endogeneity issue. Estimation of Equation (1) by OLS can lead to biased
estimates as inputs in the production function are likely to be related to the residuals. Let us
decompose the residuals as follows:
isct = ωisct + uisct (2)
Equation (2) decomposes firm efficiency into a part that is predictable by the firm ωisct, though
not observable in the data, and a part due to a productivity shock that can be forecast neither by
the firm nor by the econometrician.
Firms choose their input on the basis of their knowledge of their environment and own efficiency
ωisct. Hence, if firms that anticipate high efficiency level hire more workers and invest more, OLS
estimates will be biased upward. The endogeneity of input choices is well known in the literature.
Consistent productivity estimates are obtained using the semi-parametric estimation techniques of
Olley and Pakes (1996) or Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). These methods correct for simultaneity
biases. To carry out such estimations, we need data on investment for the former and intermediate
inputs for the latter in order to proxy firm’s private knowledge of its efficiency.
Our preferred TFP estimates are those from the Levinsohn and Petrin (LP) method, which uses
information on materials to correct for simultaneity biases. We do not use the Olley and Pakes
technique, as their method requires primary information on investment to proxy for unobserved
productivity shocks, while prior information on investment is not provided in Amadeus. Although
we could create an investment measure using the perpetual inventory equation, we do not follow
this path because of a high probability of measurement errors in capital depreciation.
Hence, we compute firm-level TFP by using intermediate inputs m to capture variation in firms’
prediction of their efficiency ω:
ωisct = f(misct, kisct)
Introducing this function into Equation equation:prodfn, we now have:
lnYisct = αsc ln lisct + βsc ln kisct + f(misct, kisct) + uisct (3)
The variation in inputs is now not related with the error term uisct so that we have consistent
estimates of the parameters. We compute each firm’s TFP as the residual from an estimate of
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Equation (3). At this stage, firms’ TFP values are not yet comparable across sectors and countries.
Following Pavcnik (2002) and Fernandez (2007), we construct a TFP index to deal with the
comparability issue. The TFP index is based on the LP estimates and is constructed in two steps.
First, for each 4-digit sector s and country c, we construct a reference hypothetical plant that
has mean output and input levels calculated over the whole period. We compute the TFP of this
reference plant as:
Ârefsc = Y sc − α̂scLsc − β̂scKsc (4)
where α̂sc and β̂sc are the estimates obtained from the regression estimate of Equation (3).
Second, we obtain plant i’s productivity index at time t by subtracting the reference plant
productivity Aref from plant i’s productivity as estimated in Equation (4):
Aisct = Yisct − α̂scLisct − β̂scKisct − Ârefsc (5)
This index number methodology follows Aw et al. (2001) and Caves and Tretheway (1980). The
relative TFP measure obtained ensures comparability across industries and countries.
Table 1: Summary statistics – Firm TFP growth
Country Standard deviation 10th percentile mean median 90th percentile
All 2.87 -1.24 -.01 .01 1.28
BEL 4.09 -1.76 0 0 1.79
CZE 1.78 -.84 .09 .01 1.03
DEU 10.83 -1.7 .41 0 2.5
DNK 6.72 -.72 .14 .01 1.17
ESP 2.01 -1.01 .01 0 1.04
FIN 2.1 -1.3 .04 .01 1.46
FRA 1.2 -.63 .06 .03 .76
GBR 4.17 -1.64 -.05 -.02 1.53
ITA 2.3 -1.55 .01 .01 1.56
NLD 3.51 -1.83 .14 0 2.54
NOR 2.01 -1.12 .06 .04 1.35
POL 4.32 -1.75 .47 .05 3.13
PRT 2.15 -1.02 .07 .01 1.36
SWE 6.43 -4.16 -.45 -.03 3.4
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Amadeus database. Not resampled dataset.
We then compute firms’ TFP growth rates as the log difference: ∆Aisct = lnAisct − lnAisct−1.
Summary statistics for firm’s TFP growth are shown in Table 1. It displays the standard variation,
the mean, median, the 10th and 90th percentiles of firm’s TFP growth for each country. It shows
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that there is a wide variation in ∆Aisct both within and across countries.
2.4 Trade openness
To capture the pro-competitive impact of trade we construct a proxy for foreign competition which is
import penetration. Trade data come from the Comtrade database. By combining it with detailed
production data from OECD Structural Demographic Business Statistics (SDBS) database, we
compute different openness measures at the 4-digit sectoral level. Import penetration is constructed
in the following way for each sector, country and year:
IPsct =
Msct
Qsct +Msct −Xsct
where Msct is total imports of good s to country c in year t. Qsct is the production of good s while
Xsct is the exports of good s from country c to its trade partners in year t.
Summary statistics for the import penetration measure across countries are shown in Table
2. This table displays the median, the 25th and 75th percentiles of import penetration. There is
considerable variation in import penetration across country and time, and these differences persist
even within narrowly defined sectors.
Table 2: Summary statistics – Import penetration
1996 2005
Country 25th percentile median 75th percentile 25th percentile median 75th percentile
All .17 .43 .75 .23 .55 .87
BEL .36 .7 1.26 .42 .88 1.57
CZE .05 .35 .61 .25 .61 1.02
DEU .02 .2 .64 .2 .41 .87
DNK .32 .59 .86 .4 .76 1.22
ESP .13 .29 .55 .17 .46 .68
FIN .16 .47 .67 .18 .49 .82
FRA .17 .37 .54 .23 .48 .7
GBR .17 .4 .61 .24 .54 .78
GRC .06 .26 .63 .3 .58 .82
ITA .12 .22 .37 .14 .31 .5
NLD .42 .96 1.41 .4 .84 1.73
NOR .36 .62 .82 .3 .62 .91
POL .02 .25 .44 .16 .55 .75
PRT .15 .41 .72 .23 .49 .76
SWE .21 .51 .84 .27 .55 .93
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Comtrade and OECD SDBS databases.
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2.5 Regulation and market structure measures
The primary measure of regulation is the OECD product market regulation indicators of de jure
anti-competitive regulations, focusing on the vintages which coincide with the coverage of the
Amadeus data. These include the 1998 and 2003 data updates, the settings for which are assumed
to be unchanged for the immediately following years, preceeding the most recent 2008 data update.
These indicators include both domestic as well as international barriers; only the domestic barriers
are used here, specifically the grouping ‘barriers to entrepreneurship’, which covers sub-indicators
for administrative burdens on startups, regulatory and administrative opacity and sectoral barriers
to competition. Each of the low-level indicators are based on a scoring of regulatory data on a 0 to 6
scale reflecting the extent to which the regulations inhibit competition (see Wo¨lfl et al., 2009).
A Herfindahl index of firm concentration at the four-digit level using the Amadeus firm database
is used to control for the extent of de facto competition from domestic firms. It is calculated in the
standard way, based on the sum of the square revenue market shares of each firm in an industry, so
that it ranges between 1/n and 1 where n is the number of firms. The OECD ‘Regimpact’ measure,
which assesses the industry-specific knock-on effects of anti-competitive regulation in seven network
sectors is also used in robustness checks to control for the extent of upstream regulation.6
Table 3 displays some summary statistics for the main measures of domestic competition.
Though there has been convergence in these measures over time, a wide variation is still observed
across countries.
3 Empirical analysis of firm-level productivity
3.1 The effect of competition
Competition may stem from both foreign as well as domestic sources, which we take into account
by differentiating the two. Our methodology assumes that increased import shares are equivalent
to an increase in competition within a narrowly defined industry and that this increase is exogenous
to the productivity growth of an individual firm. Several studies document that increased imports
amount to tougher competition: for instance, Katics and Petersen (1994) find that it is associated
6These indicators are calculated using a bottom-up approach in which regulatory data are quantified and aggre-
gated to into summary indicators by sector using weights from I/O tables.
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Table 3: Summary statistics – Market structure and domestic regulation
‘Barriers to entrepreneurship’ Index
Country Standard deviation 10th percentile mean median 90th percentile
All .6 1.45 2.23 2.39 3.05
BEL .22 1.88 2.16 2.33 2.33
CZE .08 2.09 2.13 2.09 2.27
DEU .24 1.83 2.05 1.83 2.31
DNK .17 1.42 1.52 1.42 1.82
ESP .35 1.63 2.17 2.39 2.39
FIN .49 1.42 2.01 2.41 2.41
FRA .62 1.79 2.55 3.05 3.05
GBR .23 .95 1.29 1.45 1.45
ITA .54 1.58 2.38 2.74 2.74
NLD .13 1.78 1.93 2.05 2.05
NOR .21 1.33 1.45 1.33 1.83
POL .28 3.15 3.42 3.15 3.72
PRT .25 1.57 2.02 2.16 2.16
SWE .48 1.15 1.69 2.11 2.11
Herfindahl Index
Country Standard deviation 10th percentile mean median 90th percentile
All .08 0 .05 .02 .12
BEL .12 .01 .09 .04 .23
CZE .11 .01 .09 .06 .22
DEU .2 .04 .22 .16 .45
DNK .11 .02 .11 .08 .21
ESP .07 0 .03 .01 .07
FIN .13 .02 .11 .06 .25
FRA .07 0 .04 .02 .1
GBR .09 .01 .08 .04 .18
ITA .06 0 .03 .01 .08
NLD .21 .05 .23 .15 .53
NOR .09 0 .05 .03 .09
POL .13 .02 .1 .05 .25
PRT .21 .06 .22 .15 .51
SWE .09 .01 .07 .03 .17
Source: ‘Barriers to entrepreneurship’ is sourced from the OECD Regulatory database.
The Herfindahl Index is based on author’s calculations using the Amadeus database.
with reduced price-cost margins using industry-level data for the United States. Recent empirical
studies, including Aghion et al. (2009), Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2011), Fernandez (2007) and Pavcnik
(2002), use import shares as measures of competition from trade, while Kletzer (2002) discusses
assumptions necessary for this approach to be valid. Using a more structural approach, Chen
et al. (2009) find that import penetration has a boosting effect on industry average productivity,
supporting the pro-competitive effect of trade predicted by the theoretical model of Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008).
To capture domestic competition, different measures have been proposed in the literature, such
as price-cost margins and concentration indexes. Both measures have substantial flaws. First,
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they do not allow the effect of foreign competition to be distinguished from the effect of domestic
competition. Secondly, while both sources of competition are supposed to put a downward pressure
on price-cost margins, it is not clear that higher concentration indexes indicate lower competitive
forces. Indeed, pressures from abroad may lead to exit of domestic firms, resulting in a small
number of national firms operating, and a more concentrated domestic sector. While we control
for concentration, we believe that the two sub-indexes of product market regulation that we use,
namely barriers to entrepreneurship and burdens on startups, capture more accurately domestic
competitive pressures, as they are direct measures of barriers to market entry.
Aghion et al. (2009) exploit several policy reforms that influenced the competitive environment
in Europe, namely the European Single Market Program and industry specific reforms imposed
by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. They claim that those experiments enable them to
identify the causal impact of competition on innovation. The perspective of this paper is similar; it
makes the most of a country-specific product market regulation (PMR) index that captures various
product market reforms that took place in OECD countries between 1998 and 2008. The product
market regulation index captures various policies with different treatment intensity across countries
and time.
Our empirical analysis highlights that the effect of foreign competition varies with the local
stringency of product market regulation. Theoretical predictions on the interaction between trade
and product market regulation are ambiguous though. On one hand, PMR and openness can
go in the same direction and have a positive additive effect by demanding further productivity
improvements. While foreign exposure reduces rents and demand stronger competitiveness to
survive, this pro-competitive effect can be higher in countries with stringent regulation protecting
incumbents as it creates new incentives to upgrade the production technology. On the other hand,
rigidities can impede reallocation, innovation and firm adjustments, reducing the ability to react
quickly to new competitive pressures.
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3.2 Empirical specification: difference-in-differences
We relate firm-level TFP growth to domestic and foreign competition as well as domestic regulation
in the following way:
∆Aisct = β0 + β1IPsct + β2IPsct × PMRct + β3Xisct + γs +Dct + isct (6)
where ∆Aisct is the productivity growth of firm i that belongs to sector s and country c, IPsct is
the level of import penetration in sector s for country c in year t, PMRct is the level of product
market regulation in country c and year t. One issue is that productivity growth can vary across
firms because of sectoral features that have nothing to do with competitive pressures. To avoid
any spurious correlation due to industry characteristics, sector fixed effects γs are included. They
capture time-invariant characteristics that, for example, shape the potential for technological up-
grading. It is also very likely that TFP growth is influenced by other institutional determinants
or policies that do not affect competition. Country-time fixed effects Dct are added to deal with
this type of correlation. The country-time fixed effects also address country macroeconomic shock
common to all sectors. Xisct is a set of control variables that vary across firms and time such as
the size of the firm or across sectors s, country c and time t such as the level of concentration or
the impact of regulation in services sectors on the manufacturing sector under study.
Equation (6) enables us to understand first how firm-level TFP growth depends on foreign
competition (β1), and second, how the effect of foreign competition varies with the regulation
of the product market (β2). Since we control for industry and country-time fixed effects, this
specification identifies the effect of foreign competition through differential evolution of the import
penetration across industries (industry-time variation).
Models of endogenous growth, considering the existence of technological flows between firms
across all countries, dwell on the role played by the pool of highly innovative firms in driving pro-
ductivity growth of incumbent firms. Productivity growth of followers depends on the productivity
growth of the global technological frontier. Adding productivity growth of the frontier firms (top
1 percent in levels), we estimate:
∆Aisct = β0 + α∆A
front
st + β1IPsct + β2IPsct × PMRct + β3Xisct + γs +Dct + isct (7)
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where ∆Afrontst is the frontier’s productivity growth. We compute the productivity level of the
industry-year specific frontier Afrontst by taking the average productivity level of the top 1 percent
of firms across all countries: it is thus a global frontier which is consistent with our cross-country
empirical strategy.7
3.3 The importance of the firm’s distance to the frontier
We allow for a non-monotonic effect of competition according to the heterogeneity of firms. The
position on the firm in the productivity distribution is determined specific to its industry, with the
right tail of the distribution representing the technological or productivity frontier. Is the positive
escape-competition effect conditional on the distance of the firm to its industry frontier? The
rationale behind this question is the following: the closer firms are to the frontier, the stronger the
escape-competition effect on TFP growth tends to be. In other words, the pro-competitive effect
of trade displays a boosting effect for firms with relatively high level of productivity. On the other
hand, for laggard firms, an increase of competition due to the entry of foreign products on their
market has a depressing effect because they are too far from the frontier to cope with it.
To capture the size of the technology gap among firms in an open-economy setting, we compare
each firm’s productivity to the median productivity of the the same sector and year. We then
divide firms into two groups: a group of firms that are above the median level of TFP – those
closer to the global TFP frontier – and a group of firms that have a TFP level below the median of
their industry – who have a larger technological gap. To evaluate the differential impact of foreign
competition and product market regulation according to firm heterogeneity in technology gap, we
estimate Equations (6) and (7) separately for the two sub-samples.
3.4 The issue of reverse causality
Foreign competition is proxied by import penetration. It is possible that a bias exists because of
reverse causality between firm productivity and trade orientation of the firm’s sector. Foreign firms
are able to enter more heavily a market if domestic firms are not efficient, leaving the competitive
advantage to trade partners. This implies a negative correlation between productivity and import
shares. However, this relation should be weak in our specification as we regress firm level produc-
7As a robustness check, we also compute the productivity frontier using the average of the top 5% of firms.
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Table 4: Impact of import penetration and PMR on firms’ TFP growth
Not resampled data set
PMR variable Barriers to entrepreneurship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Close to Far from All Close to Far from
firms the frontier the frontier firms the frontier the frontier
IP 0.173** 0.542** 0.019 0.175** 0.445** 0.011
(0.084) (0.215) (0.031) (0.076) (0.201) (0.028)
IP×PMR -0.094** -0.292** -0.008 -0.128*** -0.303*** 0.032
(0.043) (0.114) (0.016) (0.046) (0.102) (0.029)
Herf 0.021 0.132 0.317***
(0.221) (0.377) (0.098)
IP×Herf 0.134** 0.275* -0.130**
(0.066) (0.165) (0.060)
Constant 0.373 1.004 -0.381*** 0.384 0.988 -0.454***
(0.758) (1.012) (0.060) (0.752) (0.996) (0.068)
Observations 455,491 234,361 221,130 455,491 234,361 221,130
R-squared 0.024 0.033 0.033 0.024 0.033 0.033
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered standard errors by country and sector.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
tivity on sectoral import shares. We also consider that the reverse causality issue is less acute when
we look at TFP growth compared to productivity levels. Finally, this could bias us away from
finding a productivity-enhancing effect of import competition. In spite of this, our results indicate
a positive relationship between productivity growth of the top firms and import penetration, which
strengthens our confidence in the findings.
3.5 Interpretation of results
The first set of results of the estimation of Equation equation:estbase are shown in Tables 4 and
5, while Tables 6, 7 and 8 provide robustness checks of the same equation. These results are
based on the regression of firm-level productivity growth on import penetration (IP ) and the
interaction between import penetration and domestic regulation (IP ×PMR). Import penetration
at the sectoral level (IP ) is used to proxy foreign competition pressures, while the ‘barriers to
entrepreneurship’ index is used to measure the stringency of domestic regulation (PMR). The
same equations are also estimated with the control variables. The first set of results, Tables 4
through 7, use the ‘barriers to entrepreneurship’ index (PMR) contemporaneously and with lags,
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Table 5: Lagged impact of import penetration and PMR on firms’ TFP growth
Not resampled data set
PMR variable Barriers to entrepreneurship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Close to Far from All Close to Far from
firms the frontier the frontier firms the frontier the frontier
IPt−1 0.166* 0.518** -0.039 0.135 0.419* -0.012
(0.100) (0.222) (0.071) (0.096) (0.249) (0.071)
IP×PMRt−1 -0.088* -0.281** 0.025 -0.108** -0.268** 0.036
(0.051) (0.118) (0.034) (0.052) (0.120) (0.037)
Herft−1 -0.046 0.042 0.314***
(0.230) (0.408) (0.088)
IP×Herft−1 0.142** 0.168 -0.089
(0.057) (0.142) (0.068)
Constant 0.380 0.908 -0.428*** 0.408 0.907 -0.489***
(0.731) (0.942) (0.088) (0.731) (0.940) (0.093)
Observations 454,375 233,529 220,846 454,375 233,529 220,846
R-squared 0.022 0.030 0.033 0.022 0.030 0.033
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered standard errors by country and sector.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
both with the default dataset (Tables 4 and 5) and the resampled dataset (Tables 6 and 7).
Overall, the results, which split the sample by distance to frontier, are highly consistent with our
hypotheses, and are robust across specifications, including those that account for potential reverse
causality (using lagged values of IP ) and potential sampling bias (on the resampled dataset).
Changes in firm productivity are impacted by both the domestic institutional environment and
the extent of openness to foreign markets. However, firms’ responses to foreign competition are
heterogeneous, even within narrowly defined sectors. The evolution of firm TFP growth depends
remarkably on its position in the distribution of firm efficiency. Firms that are technologically
advanced benefit from competitive pressure of foreign firms’ entry into their domestic markets. This
“escape competition effect” is only present for the most competitive firms, with foreign competition
generally having no significant impact on firms that are at the bottom of the efficiency distribution.
The positive pro-competitive effect of trade on advanced firms has a different magnitude ac-
cording to the extent of product market regulation in the country. The negative coefficient on the
interaction term indicates that trade becomes more beneficial as market regulation becomes less
stringent. The ‘barriers to entrepreneurship’ PMR index is used in the estimates shown in Tables
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Table 6: Impact of import penetration and PMR on firms’ TFP growth
Resampled data set
PMR variable Barriers to entrepreneurship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Close to Far from All Close to Far from
firms the frontier the frontier firms the frontier the frontier
IP -0.020 0.427** -0.023 -0.005 0.409* -0.002
(0.204) (0.213) (0.075) (0.207) (0.213) (0.080)
IP×PMR 0.007 -0.232** 0.008 0.002 -0.234** 0.009
(0.105) (0.114) (0.037) (0.105) (0.115) (0.039)
Herf 0.371 0.303 0.117
(0.252) (0.304) (0.097)
IP×Herf -0.010 0.036 -0.049
(0.043) (0.079) (0.046)
Constant -0.179* -5.055*** 0.073** -0.295** -5.174*** 0.042
(0.100) (0.960) (0.029) (0.150) (0.991) (0.039)
Observations 348,007 162,479 164,429 348,007 162,479 164,429
R-squared 0.037 0.043 0.025 0.037 0.043 0.025
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered standard errors by country and sector.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: Lagged impact of import penetration and PMR on firms’ TFP growth
Resampled data set
PMR variable Barriers to entrepreneurship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Close to Far from All Close to Far from
firms the frontier the frontier firms the frontier the frontier
IPt−1 0.422** 0.718** 0.273* 0.400* 0.645** 0.339**
(0.209) (0.282) (0.160) (0.228) (0.305) (0.159)
IP×PMRt−1 -0.193* -0.357*** -0.128* -0.193* -0.348** -0.127*
(0.099) (0.134) (0.076) (0.099) (0.135) (0.076)
Herft−1 -0.024 -0.249 0.067
(0.288) (0.351) (0.110)
IP×Herft−1 0.051 0.302 -0.160
(0.208) (0.304) (0.105)
Constant -0.250*** -5.269*** -0.089*** -0.241** -5.189*** -0.117***
(0.062) (0.832) (0.018) (0.115) (0.854) (0.035)
Observations 338,137 158,549 159,645 338,137 158,549 159,645
R-squared 0.039 0.043 0.028 0.039 0.043 0.028
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered standard errors by country and sector.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Impact of import penetration and PMR on firms’ TFP growth
Not resampled data set
PMR variable Burdens on startups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Close to Far from All Close to Far from
firms the frontier the frontier firms the frontier the frontier
IP 0.075 0.189*** -0.039* 0.181** 0.122 0.071
(0.050) (0.073) (0.023) (0.072) (0.113) (0.070)
IP×PMR -0.055* -0.117*** 0.032* -0.079*** -0.113** 0.012
(0.029) (0.044) (0.019) (0.029) (0.044) (0.025)
Herf -0.121 -0.035 0.422***
(0.260) (0.277) (0.101)
IP×Herf -0.141 0.130 -0.145*
(0.086) (0.159) (0.078)
Constant -0.042 -0.614 -0.481*** -0.017 -0.597 -0.561***
(0.309) (0.470) (0.109) (0.323) (0.475) (0.104)
Observations 417,389 237,355 160,651 417,389 237,355 160,651
R-squared 0.025 0.046 0.035 0.025 0.046 0.035
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered standard errors by country and sector.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4 through 7, which reflects anti-competitive measures such as entry barriers and administrative
burdens that inhibit competition across sectors.
To more clearly delineate the effects of the measures, the ‘burdens on startups’ sub-indicator
is used in Table 8. This indicator focuses more clearly on administrative burdens for new firms,
including sector-specific burdens. Using this index, these results yield coefficient estimates that
are qualitatively very similar to the estimates with the broader PMR ‘barriers to entrepreneurship’
index shown in the previous tables. The other two PMR sub-indicators of this index, ‘regulatory
and administrative opacity’ and ‘barriers to competition’, show less significance.
Domestic competition may also vary within a country, across sectors. This may have an effect
on firms’ incentives to upgrade their technology. The level of competition within a sector can be
proxied by the concentration level within a sector.8 In concentrated sectors, firms are not forced to
reduce prices and can make positive profits more easily. Hence low productivity firms can survive.
8We also use the Regimpact regulatory impact index to help control for pressures that may affect costs. Regimpact
can control for the cost structure of intermediate inputs coming from upstream sectors. Robustness checks were run
with all of the estimated equations, and the inclusion of Regimpact in the equations does not affect the interpretation
of the estimates. Firms that are closer to the frontier are found to cope more easily with high regulation in upstream
services sectors, and it has a damping effect on firms farther from the frontier.
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Table 9: The impact of IP and PMR on firms’ TFP growth, with frontier TFP growth
Not resampled data set
PMR variable Barriers to entrepreneurship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Close to Far from All Close to Far from
firms the frontier the frontier firms the frontier the frontier
∆Afront 0.003*** 0.005** 0.001* 0.003*** 0.005** 0.001*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
IP 0.172** 0.494** -0.040 0.162* 0.382* 0.002
(0.087) (0.197) (0.063) (0.086) (0.202) (0.055)
IP×PMR -0.092** -0.265** 0.020 -0.102** -0.252** 0.046
(0.045) (0.105) (0.032) (0.050) (0.104) (0.035)
Herf 0.160 0.239 0.346***
(0.191) (0.374) (0.097)
IP×Herf 0.058 0.204 -0.164***
(0.055) (0.143) (0.061)
Constant -0.612*** -0.770** -0.425*** -0.637*** -0.817** -0.503***
(0.191) (0.350) (0.092) (0.206) (0.393) (0.102)
Observations 414,890 211,820 203,070 414,890 211,820 203,070
R-squared 0.032 0.042 0.031 0.032 0.043 0.031
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered standard errors by country and sector.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Our analysis suggests that the concentration level has a different impact on more advanced versus
laggard firms, based on the raw dataset (Tables 4 and 5). While high concentration seems to
allow less efficient firms to perform well, it is not a condition for high productivity firms whose
TFP growth rates are not significantly affected by the concentration level. Such a concentration
index is however an imperfect measure of competition as it does not capture the existence of entry
threats. Moreover it focuses on a geographically limited definition of competition while European
manufacturing sectors are open and some firms operate in international markets. Our favored
measure of competition is the product market regulation index, as it can proxy unobservable entry
threats as well as the existing regulatory scope that can be used to adjust to changes in market
structure.
These results are robust to a number of alternative specifications, such as inclusion of the
growth of the productivity frontier (Table 9, using Equation (7)) or the restriction of the sample
to only surviving firms (Table 10). While these changes in specification have a slight impact on
the results, they remain the same in sign, significance and roughly the same in magnitude, in these
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Table 10: The impact of IP and PMR on surviving firms’ TFP growth
Not resampled, balanced data set
PMR variable Barriers to entrepreneurship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Close to Far from All Close to Far from
firms the frontier the frontier firms the frontier the frontier
IP 0.212** 0.602*** -0.024 0.199* 0.571*** 0.032
(0.106) (0.218) (0.075) (0.101) (0.216) (0.069)
IP×PMR -0.114** -0.323*** 0.014 -0.119** -0.319*** 0.036
(0.056) (0.116) (0.038) (0.057) (0.115) (0.041)
Herf -0.021 0.019 0.384***
(0.268) (0.441) (0.120)
IP×Herf 0.048 0.056 -0.187**
(0.065) (0.111) (0.077)
Constant -0.688* -0.945 -0.429*** -0.677* -0.944 -0.525***
(0.380) (0.649) (0.043) (0.382) (0.657) (0.050)
Observations 230,267 125,647 104,620 230,267 125,647 104,620
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered standard errors by country and sector.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
contemporaneous results. We have also checked for the inclusion of other controls at the firm level,
such as an indicator of exit during the period, the size of the firm, which has no discernible effect
on the main results.
Inclusion of the direct effect of product market regulation has a somewhat larger effect on the
results, which was expected as we include country fixed effect and year fixed effect separately to
estimate the impact of country-wide PMR. Yet the results on our variables of principal interest,
import penetration and its interaction with PMR remain qualitatively similar.
3.6 Effects on productivity
What is the economic significance of the results just discussed? Taking our preferred equation
estimates from Table 4, the effects of changes in import penetration and product market reform can
be simulated for within-firm productivity growth, among the relatively large firms in our dataset.
Given the difference-in-differences specification of the estimation equation, we therefore focus on
conditional shocks. A qualitative visualization of these simulations is shown in Figure 1.
Increases in import penetration (IP) only boost firm TFP growth if PMR is sufficiently low,
below a certain threshold (Figure 1, Panel A) equivalent to the median PMR setting at the end
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Figure 1: Estimated within-firm TFP growth effects under conditional IP and PMR shocks
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(d) PMR shocks: Top firms
Source: Simulations based on equation estimates from Table 4, columns 2 and 3.
of the period studied. If PMR is higher than this threshold, an increase in IP (i.e. international
competition) has a perverse impact on TFP, leading to negative TFP growth through discourage-
ment. This effect arises from an even larger-magnitude effect on the firms in the upper half of the
productivity distribution (Panel B). To take a particular example, for firms in the United Kingdom,
the country with the lowest PMR, an increase in import penetration of 10 percentage points would
raise firm TFP growth by approximately 1.0% per year on average, or 2.7% for the firms in the
upper half of the productivity distribution. Yet for countries (primarily in earlier time periods)
with higher PMR settings, the effect is essentially reversed.
A similar simulation can be carried out for a range of PMR reforms taking varying levels
of import penetration as given (Figure 1, Panels C and D). Product market regulatory reforms
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unambiguously boost productivity growth; however, their effects are magnified considerably when
import penetration is higher. For instance, a PMR reform of 10% of the median setting would boost
within-firm productivity growth by 0.5% in a sector at the 25th percentile of import penetration,
and by 2.3% in a sector at the 75th percentile. Again, the impact is driven by firms in the upper
half of the productivity distribution, where productivity growth is boosted by 1.4% and 6.3%,
respectively. For firms in the lower half of the productivity distribution, the impact of PMR reform
through this channel is negligible. Countries with a large share of high-productivity firms will thus
benefit much more from PMR reforms.
4 Conclusion
This paper offers a new assessment of the effect of import penetration on firm-level productivity
growth, taking into account heterogeneity in distance to the technological frontier and country
differences in product market regulation. Our results show that firms in sectors with higher import
penetration have higher TFP growth only if the firms are close to their sectoral technology frontier.
Only the most productive firms enjoy an increase in productivity when foreign competitors’ pressure
is high. This result illustrates that in order to understand firms’ TFP growth, it is important to
combine explanations based on the pro-competitive effect of trade with a “Schumpeterian” distance-
to-the-frontier mechanism, an area that theoretical trade models have overlooked to date.
The pro-competitive effect of international trade depends on domestic product market regulation
as measured by the OECD’s Product Market Regulation (PMR) index. Our results indicate that,
at the top of the productivity distribution, the positive effect of foreign competition is inhibited for
firms operating in a country with stringent regulation such as higher barriers to entry. Domestic
and foreign competitive pressures are found to be complementarity: firms’ incentives or abilities to
improve their productivity to cope with foreign competition are stronger in countries with lower
levels of PMR. As for firms at the bottom of the productivity distribution, foreign competition
does not have a significant within-firm benefit on their efficiency – irrespective of the regulatory
environment – though it may faciliate their demise, whereby they relinquish their market share to
more productive firms.
Future work in this area could go beyond this paper in a number of respects. First, if firm-level
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trade information were available in a multi-country dataset, both the extensive and intensive mar-
gins could be examined, since their impact on competition likely differs. Second, instrumentation
of import penetration would make the results for the measure more robust. Third, once a longer
time series of domestic regulation indicators is available, further analysis would be worthwhile.
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A Annex
Table A.1: The impact of IP and PMR on surviving firms’ TFP growth
With firm fixed effects – Not resampled, balanced data set
PMR variable Barriers to entrepreneurship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Close to Far from All Close to Far from
firms the frontier the frontier firms the frontier the frontier
IP 0.310** 0.567* 0.094 0.306** 0.513* 0.100*
(0.131) (0.312) (0.063) (0.130) (0.311) (0.059)
IP×PMR -0.168** -0.307* -0.052 -0.190** -0.312* -0.021
(0.069) (0.166) (0.033) (0.080) (0.168) (0.047)
Herf -0.070 0.165 0.050
(0.443) (0.835) (0.112)
IP×Herf 0.096 0.149 -0.121*
(0.086) (0.153) (0.070)
Constant 0.102*** 0.353*** -0.139*** 0.120*** 0.358*** -0.162***
(0.023) (0.046) (0.012) (0.036) (0.062) (0.019)
Observations 230,708 125,978 104,730 230,708 125,978 104,730
R-squared 0.036 0.046 0.006 0.036 0.046 0.006
Number of IDs 34,071 25,210 22,054 34,071 25,210 22,054
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered standard errors by country and sector.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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